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The Dayton Accord:
The Balkan Peace Agreement
Paul C. Szasz*
President William J. Clinton: "The Presidents
of Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia
1
have made a historic and heroic choice."
Secretary of State Warren Christopher: "After three weeks of intensive negotiations in Dayton, the leaders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia have
agreed to end the war in the former Yugoslavia. They have agreed that four
years of destructionis enough. The time has come to build peace with justice."2
To evaluate whether and how well the "Dayton Accord" actually works, it
may be useful to start by considering the nature and structure of that
agreement. The Accord consists of a uniquely complex set of instruments
whose intricacy on the one hand mirrors the somewhat devious processes
that led to their formulation and on the other makes it difficult to discern
what is actually "working" and who is responsible if it is not.
The over-all structure of the Dayton Accord can be presented briefly as
follows: 3
* First, there is the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (GFA), an international treaty concluded between three
neighboring ex-Yugoslav states, all U.N. members: Croatia, the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH Republic). 4 This treaty, however, has almost no substantive
content. It is mostly just a structure from which a dozen Annexes are

suspended.
* Adjunct Professor at the New York University School of Law. From September
1992 to December 1995 he served as Legal Advisor to the International Conference on
the Former Yugoslavia. From 1958 he had worked in the legal offices of the
International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, the World Bank in Washington, and the
United Nations in New York, retiring in 1989 as Deputy to the U.N. Legal Counsel;
subsequently he served as Legal Advisor to the U.N.'s Mission in Nambia (UNTAG) and
as a consultant to various U.N. offices. He received his B.S.Eng.Phys. and LL.B. from
Cornell University in 1952 and 1956, respectively.
1. Remarks Announcing the Bosnia-Herzegovina Peace Agreement and an
Exchange with Reporters, 1995:2 PUB. PAPERs 1776 (Nov. 21, 1995).
2. Keynote Remarks by Secretary of State Warren Christopher at the Initialing of
the Balkan Proximity Peace Talks Agreement, reprinted in THE INTERNATiONAL Con'aENCE ON THE FORMER YUGosI.AviA 342 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1997).

3. For a somewhat more detailed presentation of the Accord's structure, see P.C.
Szasz, Introductory Note to Bosnia and Herzegovina-Croatia-Yugoslavia: General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina with Annexes, 35 I.L.M. 75, 77-80
(1996). The texts of the Dayton Accord itself: the GFA and its Annexes, as well as
numerous related documents, are set out in volume 35 of InternationalLegal Materials
immediately following the above-cited Introductory Note.
4. Henceforth, I shall refer to these three as the "GFA Parties."
30 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 759 (1997)
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* For the most part, these Annexes are in the form of agreements between
the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the two "Entities' 5 that
are to constitute that state: the Republika Srpska and the BH Federation.6 The Annexes are of two types. Four Annexes set out transitional
arrangements by Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) and its two Entities for
largely giving formal approval to NATO and other forces and authorities
to carry out particular functions in the country. 7 Eight Annexes are basically constitutional, including the new BH Constitution; 8 the human
rights regime for the new state; 9 and the regime for the return of refugees. 10 Many of these Annexes, 1 including the Constitution, foresee a
continuing role for the Entities per se, including a role in altering the
existing agreements and in the conclusion of new ones.
* Surrounding both the GFA and its Annexes (but definitely not formally
part of them) is a cloud of arrangements that were negotiated before,
during and immediately after Dayton between the sponsors of that conference: the United States and a number of other, mainly European
states. 12 These arrangements relate to: the Implementation Force
(IFOR--ater replaced by SFOR) established by NATO; 13 the International Police Task Force (IPTF) established by the United Nations; 14 the
High Representative; 1 5 an Election Commission established by OSCE;
economic assistance, etc. The arrangements clearly involve states and
some intergovernmental organizations. However, few if any of these
arrangements are expressed as treaties. Rather they take the form of
decisions of international organs: the U.N. Security Council, the NATO
Council, OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the London Implementation
5. These might be considered, perhaps together with the entities that created the
BH Federation, as the "Intermediate Sovereigns" to which the subtitle of this Symposium

refers.
6. Henceforth, I shall refer to these three as the "BH Parties." The Federation itself
has a complex internal structure and is still not functional three years after it was established in March 1994 in Washington. The Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina is reprinted at 33 I.L.M. 743 (1994).
7. They do not, however, establish these occupying forces-that was done by the
outside powers by means of the arrangements referred to below.
8. Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Annex 4 to the General Framework
Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 117 (1996).

9. Human Rights, Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 130 (1996).

10. Refugees and Displaced Persons, Annex 7 to the General Framework Agreement
For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 136 (1996).
11. It is not clear to what extent these are international agreements? Consider

whether the U.S. Constitution is an international agreement because it originally constituted a compact between 13 independent states. How about the agreements between

West and East Germany under which the latter merged into the former?
12. Hereinafter the "Sponsoring Powers."
13. See Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuantto Security Council Resolution 1026,
U.N. SCOR, at 7-11, U.N. Doc. S/1995/1031 (1995).
14. S.C. Res. 1035, U.N. SCOR, 50th Year, Res. & Dec. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1035

(1995). The mandate for the IPTF was extended by S.C. Res. 1088, U.N. SCOR, 51st
Year, Res. & Dec. at 27, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1088 (1996).
15. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1031, U.N. SCOR, 50th Year, Res. & Dec. at 26, U.N. Doc. S/

RES/1031 (1995).
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Conference of December 1995.16 Some but not all of these are referred
to in the GFA Annexes. Neither the GFA Parties nor the BH Parties participated in any of these arrangements, even though, as will be pointed
out below, these and the related understandings significantly motivated
these Parties to conclude their agreements.
Finally, as is customary with modem international regimes, there has
been a continuing stream of further negotiations and meetings resulting
in new agreements. Thus, the aftermath of Dayton has seen agreements
between: various bilateral combinations of the three GFA Parties; the
three BH Parties; the two parties constituting the BH Federation; and
between and among the various Sponsoring Powers. In light of all of this
development, the Dayton Accord may be said to have become the Dayton
Process.
Let me try to illustrate this unique construct by a fantasy analogy
based on the American Civil War:
Imagine that in the Civil War the Confederationhad been supported by Mexico,
and the Western States, with the support of Canada, had made themselves semiindependent, though later they had entered into a loose Federationwith the
NorthernStates. This federation of Northern and Western States selected as its
Presidentthe Governor of Illinois and as its Vice-President the Governor of New
York. With Mexican help, GeneralLee wins at Gettysburg, and Washington-the
capital of both the Union and of the North/West Federation-issurrounded by
Confederate forces. The war drags on and there are more and more civilian
casualties.
The European Powers, for diverse reasons wishing the United States to survive as a state, impose a blockade on Mexico and the Confederation. Finally,
disgusted by the continuing slaughter of civilians and the failure to free the
slaves, they intervene and under British leadership require all the local leaders
to come to Manchesterfor a Peace Conference. Present, aside from the British
Foreign Ministerand ambassadorialrepresentativesof the Continental Powers,
are: President Lincoln and some members of his Cabinet representing the
United States; the Governors of Illinois and New York representingthe still nonfunctional North/West Federation;the Prime Ministerof Canada;and the Governor of the largest Mexican state-the latter representingnot only Mexico but
also the Confederation, as both jefferson Davis and General Lee are barredfrom
entering England because of their support of slavery.
What emerges is the Manchester General Framework Agreement between
Mexico, Canada and the United States (represented by Lincoln). Annexed
thereto are a dozen other agreements concluded between the United States Government, the Confederation (represented by the Mexican Governor) and the
North/West Federation. One of these agreements authorizes the military occupation of the all U.S. territoryby European powers. Others set out an entirely
new and fatally weak Constitution for the United States-to be renamed "The
Union"-and still others contain respectively the originalBill of Rights and the
new 13th-15th amendments. Aside from these texts, the European Sponsoring
Powers enter into a series of arrangementsinter se concerning: the occupation
of The Union; the overseeing of various aspects of its governancefor some time;
16. Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference Held at Lancaster House,
London, on 8 and 9 December 1995, reprinted in 35 I.L.M 225 (1996).
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the freeing of the slaves; and the financing of the extensive post-war reconstruction that is required.
That is a fair analogy of the structure of the Dayton Accord!
The "negotiations" in Dayton in November 1995, culminated nearly
four years of efforts 17 to counter the overwhelming centrifugal forces tending to separate Bosnia into three ethnically defined entities. 18 These efforts
began in the spring of 1992, before Bosnia and Herzegovina broke away
from the already truncated former Yugoslavia. Throughout this period, the
principal objectives of these parties and of the world community, particularly the Europeans, remained substantially unchanged:
* The Muslims 19 desire a democratic, united, centralized BH state, which
they would dominate through their numerical weight and their faster
growth. They also desire that all refugees and displaced persons be
allowed to return to their homes, and that war criminals be punished.
* The Serbs want no part of any common state with the Muslims and
Croats. It is not quite agreed among them whether this implies a completely independent state or one merged with Serbia or Yugoslavia. However, Republika Srpska must have a fully connected territory and be
ethnically pure, which means none of the expelled Muslims and Croats
may return to it. The Serbs do not recognize international war crimes
prosecution, and largely deny guilt for any war crimes.
* The Croatian aims have never been quite clear. Ostensibly they agree to a
single state-though one that is weak and highly decentralized into three
largely ethnically pure entities. In the long run they probably aim for the
same solution as the Serbs, with the Croatian parts of BH to be either
independent (as Herzeg Bosna) or merged into the Republic of Croatia.
* The world community largely has the following aims, most coherently
expressed at the 1992 London Conference: peace; a single state of BH,
whether centralized or federated or almost completely disassociated; no
change in BH's external boundaries; return of refugees; and prosecution
of war criminals. 20 These aims largely overlap with those of the Muslims,
except that the latter fought for a centralized, majority-ruled state, while
the world community was willing to settle for some arrangement that
would be at least marginally acceptable to the Serbs and Croats-even if
the resulting structure would consequently be terminally weak and considerably undemocratic.
It was this history and these effectively irreconcilable political aims
that dictated the format of the Dayton proceedings, sometimes referred to
17. For a very brief listing of the successive steps in this process, see P.C. Szasz, The
Protection of Human Rights Through the Dayton/ParisPeaceAgreement on Bosnia, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 301, 301-03 (1996).
18. The three "ethnic" groups constituting most of Bosnia's population are: the
Muslims constituting some 44% of the 1991 population, the Serbs (33%) and the Croats
(17%). Although commonly called "ethnic" groups, in fact, they are differentiated more
by religion than by any other factor.
19. The Muslims renamed themselves "Bosniacs" in 1994, presumably to de-emphasize their sectarian nature.
20. International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, Statement on Bosnia, Document Adopted at the London Conference, Doc. No. LC/C5 (Final), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
1537 (1992).
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as the "proximity peace talks."2 1 There were no face-to-face meetings
among the BH Parties and few even among the GFA Parties. Throughout
the negotiations, these delegations were kept in separate suites, with the
U.S. negotiators (primarily Ambassador Richard Holbrooke) moving from
party to party with texts prepared by the American team. The other Sponsoring Powers were also largely excluded from this process, though they
were briefed by the U.S. delegation and also were involved in negotiating
the inter se arrangements that would be required to implement the Accord
that was being shaped. There was therefore no opportunity for the most
directly affected participants, the BH Parties, to explore to what extent they
agreed upon the meaning of the texts that were being presented separately
to them. Nor could they be certain that the understandings that they individually reached with their American counterparts were the same as those
reached with the other BH and GFA Parties.
For differing reasons, none of the BH Parties were at all eager to enter
into the arrangements reflected in the BH Constitution and the related
Annexes. Consequently, a good deal of arm twisting had to be dispensed,
though unevenly, to each of the prospective BH and GFA Parties.
Naturally, the principal target of this arm twisting was the Republika
Srpska delegation because its aims diverged most widely from those of the
world community, as represented by the Sponsoring Powers. That delegation was further handicapped in that it was not headed by any Bosnian
Serb (as President Karadjic had been banned from the talks as an indicted
war criminal), but by President Milosevic of Serbia, 2 2 who also represented
the FRY (of which Serbia is the largest constituent). It is known that, as to
many crucial points, Milosevic did not consult with or take the advice of
the Bosnian Serb representatives. Consequently, the latter declined to initial the several instruments that emerged from Dayton, and the consent of
the Republika Srpska was only obtained some days later by U.S. representatives visiting Pale and presumably exerting further pressure and perhaps
making further promises.
Aside from the threats and other pressures exerted on the prospective
parties (the so-called "sticks"), a number of promises were made (the "carrots"). Like the threats, the promises were also largely undocumented.
They evidently concerned matters such as:
23
+ The nature and mandate of IFOR;
+ The amount and nature of the economic assistance to be provided;
21. See, e.g., THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE FomEa YUGOSLAVIA, supra note
2, at 342.
22. This arrangement had been agreed to on August 29, 1995, by an instrument that
is referred to in the preamble to the GFA, but has not been published. See General
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 89

(1996).
23. Annex IA to the GFA did not specify the IFOR mandate but only stated the outer
limits of the consent of the BH Parties to the occupation of their territories. The actual
mandate was set later by the competent NATO organs. Military Aspects of the Peace
Settlement, Annex 1A to the General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 91 (1996).
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# The arrangements OSCE would make for the initial elections;2 4
25
# The arming of the Muslims;
# The arrest of war criminals indicted by the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal.2 6 There can be little doubt that the Muslims were at least implicitly
promised that this would be carried out promptly by the overwhelming
forces NATO and, in part, the United Nations (IPTF) would put into the
country. On the other hand, it is difficult to believe that the Serbs (even in
the absence of Karadjic) would not have secured what at least they considered an effective pledge (perhaps given only by winks and nods) that
there would be no arrests; except in situations of unconditional surrender, a party giving up power after a bloody conflict invariably insists on
some form of amnesty or exile beyond the reach of the new authorities.
o The return of refugees and displaced persons to their former homes and
the restoration of their property or compensation for any that was lost or
destroyed. Again, the Muslims must have received promises that this
would be accomplished promptly, presumably by the use of NATO muscle, while the Serbs must somehow have been led to believe that this was
not an imminent threat.
This picture is a far different one from that sketched by President
Clinton and Secretary Christopher at the close of the Dayton Conference 2 7
about the parties "agreeing" to conclude peace. The truth is that they were
largely bludgeoned and partly bribed into putting their initials and (a few
weeks later, in Paris) their signatures to texts that none of them had any
significant role in developing. Despite their importance, the GFA and the
annexed agreements all entered into force on signature, without ratification. 28 This was necessary because ratification, aside from necessarily
delaying entry into force, would certainly not have been obtained from the
Republika Srpska, and possibly not even from others of the BH or the GFA
Parties.
24. Annex 3 to the GFA merely empowered OSCE to conduct the elections. Elections, Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 136 (1996).
25. This was a unilateral undertaking by the United States, in opposition to the
desires of most of the other Sponsoring Powers. In actually implementing this undertaking, the United States unexpectedly added another condition: that the Muslims send
home a number of Iranian troops and advisers. Delays in complying with this new
requirement initially delayed the flow of U.S. military assistance. Also, as the United
States could not supply such assistance officially, this was done through specially established private enterprises set up by ex-military officers. Still another complication is
that the United States is actually trying to strengthen all of the practically inoperative BH
Federation armed forces, rather than just the Muslim component thereof.
26. The GFA and its Annexes are less than pellucid as to this matter and even the
Security Council resolutions adopted in the wake of Dayton do not provide clear directions. See Szasz, supra note 17, at 313-14.
27. See opening quotes above.
28. The Concluding Statement of the Dayton Conference provided that by initialling
"the Framework Agreement and its Annexes, [the heads of the delegations of the GFA
and BH Parties established] the initialled documents as definitive, and [signified] their
consent to be bound thereby and their commitment to sign the Framework Agreement
and its Annexes without delay." Concluding Statement by the Participants in the Bosnia
Proximity Peace Talks, reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 168, 169 (1996).
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None of these Parties achieved at Dayton anything close to what they
had been bloodily fighting for for years. This was not too surprising an
outcome because their respective objectives were almost diametrically
opposed, so that any compromise would require each of them to surrender
some of their vital goals.
+ The Muslims achieved the maintenance of Bosnia and Herzegovina as
nominally one country, but they must have realized that it was effectively
ungovernable under the Dayton Constitution, whose practical implementation would require an amount of good will and cooperation among
three factions that would strain even groups with normally friendly relations.2 9 Such good will and cooperation cannot realistically be expected
from the murderously opposed BH Parties. Though the procedures for
the return of refugees was specified in great detail in a special Annex to
the GFA, 30 the Muslims should also have realized that it was most
unlikely that sufficient foreign forces would be provided to return Muslims to Banja Luka or to other Serb- (or even Croat-) occupied areas
against the absolutely fierce resistance that could be expected from those
two peoples against any threat to re-integrate their "ethnically cleansed"
territories. However, the actual results achieved so far have been below
even the probably pessimistic expectations of the Muslims.
* The Serbs and Croats were forced to live in one country with each other
and with the Muslims. Consequently, they would have to cooperate in a
central government which neither liked, even though it was likely to be
weak and ineffective because either of them could block almost all important decisions. The threat that at least some, and possibly substantial
numbers of refugees would be returned to their territories must also have
been considered intolerable-and, indeed, so far the Serbs and Croats
have not tolerated it. Nor were these peoples content with the Accord's

numerous, though weak, references to the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal.
* Unsurprisingly, the world community, under whose auspices the Conference was conducted, nominally achieved all of its significant aims: peace;
the maintenance of a single country within its original boundaries; and
the promise of the return of refugees (especially those whom some of the
European states, and particularly Germany, were hosting). Of course,
achieving these aims came at a price. Troops to monitor the peace had to
be supplied, though nominally for only a year. Also, massive economic
assistance was promised, although the totals promised always seemed to
be much larger than the sum of the individual contributions actually,
pledged.
It is no secret that the actual implementation of the Dayton Accord has
been miserable. There were two initial successes: the military confrontations and the slaughters of civilians came to a prompt halt; and, a little
later, NATO troops managed to nudge the armies of the several parties to
the boundaries prescribed by the Dayton Accord. 3 1 The failures, however,
are many: the central government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and even
29. For example, consider the de facto unanimity requirement of the three-member
Presidency. See Constitution, supra note 8, art. V.2(b)-(c).
30. Refugees and Displaced Persons, Annex 7 to the General Framework Agreement
For Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 136 (1996).
31. Inter-Entity Boundary, Annex 2 to the General Framework Agreement For Peace
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 111 (1996).
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that of the BH Federation, is barely functioning, and then only when vigorously prodded by the High Representative or by one or more of the principal NATO governments. There are no open borders between the Entities,
and even travel within the Federation is restricted. Practically no refugees
or displaced persons have been able to return to their original homes, no
property has been restored, nor has the machinery for paying compensation been set up; additionally, even if such a mechanism had been set up,
there would be practically no resources from which to pay awards. The
principal and many other war criminals are still at large, for the most part
in plain sight; in spite of explicit prohibitions in the Constitution, many of
these criminals are still officially or effectively running their respective
fiefdoms. Finally, much of the massive international economic assistance
implicitly, and to some extent even explicitly promised, has not yet arrived.
This delay is at least partly due to the inability of the Bosnian parties to
establish the governmental machinery necessary to permit such assistance
to be used effectively. Meanwhile, a bad case of donor fatigue has set in.
Clearly, the Dayton Accord is not being carried out in good faith by
anyone, including the BH and the GFA Parties on the one hand, and the
Sponsoring Powers on the other. To turn first to the failures of the latter,
because at least in part these deficiencies explain, even if they do not justify, the failures of the former, the principal dereliction of the Sponsoring
Powers is the refusal-for essentially domestic political reasons-to utilize
the power of the NATO troops for anything except the maintenance of the
peace. While NATO troops have stood by, the borders of the entities have
not been opened, refugees have not been allowed to return, indicted war
criminals have not been arrested, and the OSCE certified the September
1996 election, which was one of the keystones of the Dayton arrangements,
in spite of indications of massive fraud. The technical responses of the
Sponsoring Powers to those charges are: first, it is primarily the responsibility of the BH Parties to open their borders, to welcome back the refugees
and to deliver the war criminals to The Hague; second, NATO had never
undertaken to do those things, and indeed the actual mandate of its forces
does not require, or even permit them to do so.
But these excuses fudge the reality. No one genuinely expected the BH
Parties or even the GFA Parties to carry out these obligations on their own.
Had they ever been willing to do so, they would not have fought their
bloody war! And, even though the NATO mandate may indeed be
restricted (the actual restrictions are not a matter of public knowledge),
those limitations are simply decisions of the competent NATO organs and
of the governments represented therein. They do not reflect any corresponding restrictions in the Dayton Accord by which the BH Parties authorized NATO to occupy their country. 32 Also, these restrictions run counter

to at least the implicit promises made at Dayton to the Muslims, who certainly expected a more proactive IFOR than materialized.
32. Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement, Annex 1A to the General Framework
Agreement For Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec. 14, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 91 (1996).
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Naturally, the BH and GFA Parties are not blameless either. Indeed,
substantively, the performance by most of them most of the time has been
entirely inadequate and indeed often distinctly negative. To what might
this be attributed?
Certainly, one major excuse has always been the lack of performance
by the others of their obligations under the various agreements. In effect,
each is blaming the others for sufficient material breaches to justify the
termination or suspension of the operation of the Dayton Accord or of the
Annexes thereto. 3 3 Truly, it is practically impossible to disentangle these
conflicting claims, or to determine which was the original breach and
which the arguably permitted responses thereto.
Another excuse has been the lack of performance by the Sponsoring
Powers. These, of course, are not parties to the GFA or its Annexes but, as
suggested above, their promises probably constituted more powerful
inducement to those Parties to enter into the agreements than the expectation that the other BH Parties would fulfill their promises. Whether, from a
strictly legal perspective, such failures in the external inducements can justify a breach of the inter se agreements between the BH Parties is an interesting question, unlikely ever to be considered by a court of law.
Finally comes the question whether the BH Parties, and especially
some of them, ever honestly expected to fulfill their Dayton treaty obligations? Was there actually a genuine meeting of the minds between parties
whose representatives did not officially meet at Dayton until the moment
when they were directed to initial the texts (which one party, the Serbs,
refused to do at that time and place)? Was there the "free consent" that is
referred to in the preamble to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties? Indeed, could one argue that the conclusion of the Dayton Accord
had "been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the princi34
ples of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations,"
and was therefore void?
The last of these queries can safely be answered in the negative, for to
the extent that threats to use force were made, these threats had, in effect,
been sanctioned by the Security Council in resolutions before and after the
Dayton Conference. These resolutions had as their objective the maintenance or restoration of peace in the region-a goal that plainly could not
have been attained without the threat or use of force. Once this major
charge falls away, the other queries in the previous paragraph largely lose
35
their force. Pressure in treaty negotiations is not by itself either unlawful
nor does it invalidate the agreements reached. The general "good faith"
requirement of international law does not permit the initialling and signing
33. Article 60 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for
"[t]ermination or suspension of the operation of a treaty as a consequence of its [material]
breach." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 346.

34. Id. art. 52.
35. See David Wippman, International Law and Ethnic Conflict on Cyprus, 31 TExAs
LJ. 141, 150 (1996).
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of treaties with crossed fingers; that is, no effect can be given to any mental
reservations that a treaty (even if entered into merely to propitiate some
other country) is not to be observed.
This having been said, it must be realized that even though, from a
strictly legal point of view, the circumstances under which the Dayton
Accord was concluded do not justify its repudiation by the parties, the ab
initio lack of genuine consent to its terms goes far toward explaining the
observed lack of compliance.
In conclusion, the Dayton Accord, in spite of the fine words spoken at
the end of the proceedings and quoted above, was probably predestined to
fail. This is not because the Accord was concluded in part by "intermediate
sovereigns," but because it was imposed by massive pressures on parties
that at best consented imperfectly and thus were unlikely to implement its
terms in good faith in spite of their legal obligations to do so and because
those that exerted the pressure to initial and sign the Dayton Accord did
not, and probably never intended to, apply the massive, continuing and
long-term force necessary to make the Dayton Accord work.

